Exercise [16.18]

My answer to this exercise must be "NO" (I could not establish the assertion by myself).

I therefore looked for the proof in Penrose's book "The Emperor's New Mind", where it is however expressed with another formalism (without Turing machines). The central idea seems to be a sentence like *"This sentence cannot be proven in the formal system F"*. So here is my proposal how to express this with Turing machines:

Assume that **P** is a Turing Machine¹ that proves all calculable Π_1 -sentences of the form

"T_w(w) does not terminate",

i.e. the result of **P** is "1" if the sentence is true. If the Π_1 -sentence is false or if **P** cannot handle it, **P** shall not terminate². This can be formulated as follows:

$$P(w) = \begin{cases} 1 \implies T_w(w) \text{ does not terminate} \\ \text{does not terminate} \implies T_w(w) \text{ terminates or not} \end{cases}$$

As **P** is a Turing Machine, it must appear in the list of all Turing Machines, i.e. there must be some index *k* such that **P** = T_k . The Π_1 -sentence

$$T_k(k)$$
 does not terminate" (#)

is then my candidate for the desired $G(\ensuremath{\textbf{F}})$ sentence:

- First, this sentence (#) cannot be proven by P, i.e. we have P(k) ≠ 1, because P(k) = 1 would require that P(k) terminates. As P(k)=T_k(k), this would however be a contradiction to what was allegedly proven.
- Accordingly, <u>P(k) does not terminate</u>, i.e. the Proof-Machine P yields no result for this Π₁-sentence. However, the fact that "P(k) does not terminate" just shows the truth of the Π₁-sentence (#) because P(k)=T_k(k).

Is there any flaw in these considerations? I am grateful for any comments!

¹ I think that it is not necessary to consider several of such Turing Machines to cover all calculable Π_1 -sentences because these could be combined into one Machine.

² If **P** should in some circumstances be able to find out that $T_w(w)$ terminates, this can be ignored and **P** can be driven into an endless loop.